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Abstract
Pricing of Internet access has been characterized by two properties:
Parties are directly billed only by the Internet service provider (isp)
through which they connect to the Internet. Pricing, moreover, is
not contingent on the type of content being transmitted. These prop-
erties deﬁne a regime known as “network neutrality.” In 2005, some
large isps proposed that application and content providers directly
pay them additional fees for accessing the isps’ residential clients, as
well as diﬀerential fees for prioritizing certain content. We analyze
the private and social incentives to introduce such fees when the net-
work is congested and more traﬃc implies greater delays. We derive
conditions under which network neutrality would be welfare supe-
rior to any feasible scheme for prioritizing service. Extending our
analysis to encompass isps’ incentives to invest in more bandwidth,
we show that the ability to price discriminate increases their incen-
tives to invest. In terms of overall welfare, we show the additional
investment may or may not oﬀset any static ineﬃciency associated
with discrimination.
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At issue when a network or platform facilitates the transactions of other parties
are the prices it charges these parties for this facilitation. Since its commer-
cialization in the mid-1990s, a party (website or household) connecting to the
Internet pays only its direct provider of access. Other carriers on the network,
even if they are subsequently involved in transporting on behalf of that party,
do not collect payment from that party.
Over time, the market for connecting websites, particularly commercial sites,
has become relatively competitive. At the same time, however, there is signiﬁ-
cant monopoly power in broadband residential Internet access; that is, the con-
nections households make to their Internet Service Provider (isp). Moreover,
even when isps might compete for residential customers, the fact that these
customers almost always connect through a single isp (single-home) means that
an individual household’s isp has a monopoly on others’ access to it.
To date, consumers’ isps have not directly charged websites for the content
that passes over isps’ networks into consumers’ homes, so-called “last-mile ser-
vice.” In summer 2005, the Federal Communications Commission (fcc) reclas-
siﬁed Internet services in a way that allowed for the possibility of isps charging
content and application providers for last-mile service.1 In fall 2005, at&t pro-
posed that a new fee be paid directly to it by application and content providers
whose information packets were carried by at&t to residential customers, ir-
respective of where those application and content providers connected to the
Internet. In particular, even application and content providers that did not
connect to Internet through at&t would be subject to being charged by at&t.
Soon other telecom and cable tv companies proposed doing the same. In short,
residential-access isps proposed to introduce fees to application and content
providers (which are now zero). Additionally, they proposed to divide their res-
idential access connection pipe into “fast access” and “slow access” lanes and
charge application and content providers on the basis of the speed of access
they chose. The status quo (zero fees and no discrimination) has been dubbed
network neutrality, so imposing fees to the “other side” of the network or intro-
ducing price discrimination are considered departures from network neutrality.
The issue of network neutrality is controversial and complex. In October
2009, the fcc proposed rules that would impose network neutrality by law.
Broadly, the proponents of neutrality are consumer groups, the Obama admin-
istration,2 and companies such as Google, Skype, Amazon, eBay and Microsoft,
1Until that point, telecommunication-facility-based Internet transmissions had been sub-
ject to common-carrier regulation that compelled non-discrimination. Other Internet trans-
missions, those not telecommunication-facility-based, were not subject to common carrier
regulation. Thus, dsl service was considered a common-carrier service, and so subject to
nondiscrimination provisions. Cable modem service, in contrast, was not considered common-
carrier service, and therefore was not subject to such provisions. In 2005, the fcc reclassiﬁed
Internet transmissions from “telecommunications services” to “information services.” See
Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005). This
implied that there were no longer “non-discrimination” restrictions on Internet service pricing.
2See www.barackobama.com/pdf/issues/technology/Fact Sheet Innovation and Techno-Introduction 2
while the opponents are Cisco Systems and telecom and cable companies.
There are many advocacy papers written on the subject, but signiﬁcantly
less economic research. In the latter category, Economides and T˚ ag (in press),
in a model of diﬀerentiated consumers and content providers and monopoly
or duopoly isps, compare a world of zero fees by isps to one with positive
fees. They ﬁnd that, for most parameter values, total surplus is higher at zero
fees. With respect to the issue of price discrimination via diﬀerential quality
of service, Hermalin and Katz (2007) ﬁnd that restricting an isp to a single
quality level has the following eﬀects: (a) application and content providers that
would otherwise have purchased slow access are excluded from the market; (b)
providers “in the middle” of the market utilize higher and more eﬃcient speeds
than otherwise; and (c) providers at the top utilize lower and less eﬃcient speeds
than otherwise. Total surplus may rise or fall, although their analysis suggests
that prohibiting discrimination is likely to harm welfare. Choi and Kim (2010)
analyze prioritization using a queuing model.3 They consider two application or
content providers who are competing for eyeballs. In equilibrium, prioritization
is bought by the more eﬃcient provider, leading to consumers switching to this
provider. This improves productive eﬃciency but also induces utility losses from
consumers who do not buy their most preferred service. In their model, the net
eﬀect of departing from neutrality on welfare is, thus, ambiguous.
Our model diﬀers from the earlier literature in a number of ways. First,
we explicitly assume congestion. This means there could be a purely alloca-
tive reason to depart from network neutrality beyond any reasons stemming
from the exercise of monopoly power. Second, we assume that isps are not
producing their own content and applications for which they may seek priority
vis-` a-vis the content and applications of independent producers. This assump-
tion abstracts away from one incentive isps could have to depart from network
neutrality.4 Additionally, unlike Choi and Kim and others, we do not take the
amount of traﬃc (e.g., number of packets) sent by a given content provider
as ﬁxed. Rather, the amount of content purchased by each household from
any given content provider can vary. This is a critical extension insofar as
it means expansion in bandwidth does not necessarily increase speed because
larger bandwidth will attract more traﬃc. In this sense, our model allows for
the eﬀect, commonly observed with physical highways, that adding lanes does
not always signiﬁcantly reduce commute times.5 In turn, this has important
implications for the sort of second-degree price discrimination via diﬀerential
logy.pdf. See also Federal Communications Commission Report and Order 10–201, released
December 23, 2010.
3Like Choi and Kim, Cheng et al. (2011) and Kr¨ amer and Wiewiorra (2010) also employ
a M/M/1 queuing model to study network neutrality.
4In particular, there is a fear that isps that are also content providers, such as Comcast,
may engage in vertical foreclosure. The recent battle between Comcast and Level 3 Com-
munications (see, e.g., “Comcast Fee Ignites Fight Over Videos on Internet” in the The New
York Times, November 30, 2010) illustrates these concerns.
5See, for instance, Duranton and Turner (2011) for evidence concerning physical highways.Introduction 3
quality considered by Choi and Kim, Hermalin and Katz, and others.
Another key distinction between our work and some previous analyses is that
we seek to model the provision of quality (transmission speeds) from ﬁrst princi-
ples, rather than in a “black box” manner (e.g., as in Hermalin and Katz). This
proves critical for the following reason. One question is whether, absent price
discrimination motives, there would be a welfare gain from oﬀering multiple
service tiers. In Hermalin and Katz, because diﬀerent tiers are simply assumed
to be diﬀerentially costly to provide and there is, by implicit assumption, no
tradeoﬀ in the quality assigned one content provider with respect to the quality
that can be assigned another, one arrives at the answer that the provision of
diﬀerential quality levels is welfare superior to a single quality level. Hence, in
their model, the only reason not to have multiple tiers is because it will lead to
greater distortions via pricing than would neutrality (a common quality level).
In contrast, here we show that, for a ﬁxed amount of bandwidth, a case can be
made that welfare is greater under neutrality than under multiple tiers.
The next section of the paper presents our model. Because we wish to allow
for varying amounts of content consumption, the queuing approach of Choi and
Kim and others is not well suited to our purposes. Instead, we model last-mile
service as a “pipe” of given bandwidth. Tiering (multiple speeds) is captured
by allowing the isp to allocate portions of the bandwidth to the traﬃc from
diﬀerent content providers. This is equivalent to the isp giving priority to the
content from diﬀerent content providers via guarantees about average transmis-
sion speeds. Unlike some models, which limit the content providers to making
money solely from advertising, here the content providers can earn income by
selling content directly to households, from advertising, or from some combi-
nation thereof. To avoid complications in the modeling and welfare analysis,
we assume the content providers are not in direct competition with each other;
rather, each is a monopoly in its product space. Households place diﬀerent
values on the content of diﬀerent content providers; critically, they are more
sensitive to delay when receiving content from some providers than from others.
The principal section of the paper is Section 3, where we analyze the welfare
implications of departing from network neutrality. In that section, we show
that a suﬃcient statistic for welfare is the total amount of content traded in
equilibrium (Proposition 1). This result is reminiscent of results concerning the
welfare implications of third-degree price discrimination, although there is a sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerence insofar as discrimination means diﬀerential times rather than
diﬀerential prices. One implication of Proposition 1 is that welfare can never be
enhanced by excluding or blocking some content providers (a practice of which
some isps have been accused). A second implication of Proposition 1 is that,
for tiering to be welfare-maximizing, it is necessary that delay times be shorter
for content with greater elasticities of demand with respect to transmission time
than for content with smaller elasticities. This result is reminiscent of Ramsey
pricing, although the mechanics are diﬀerent because we are considering diﬀer-
ent times rather than diﬀerent prices. If the aforementioned elasticities don’t
vary across the diﬀerent types of content, then an absence of tiering (i.e., a
uniform level of service) is welfare maximizing.Introduction 4
A key point of the paper is that content that is more time sensitive, in a
sense made precise in Section 2.2, need not be the content with the greater
elasticity of demand with respect to transmission time. This is relevant because
the price discrimination schemes based on diﬀerential transmission speeds that
residential isps have proposed using in their pricing to the content providers
must provide faster service to more time-sensitive content.6 If it turns out that
such content is not also the content with the greater elasticities with respect to
transmission time, then such price discrimination will result in service prioriti-
zation (speeds) that are the reverse of what would be welfare maximizing (see
Proposition 5 in Section 4). Network neutrality would then be welfare superior
to any implementable price discrimination (prioritization) scheme of this sort.
Moreover, we show in the same section that mandating neutrality may be nec-
essary: absent regulation, a proﬁt-maximizing isp can have private incentives
to implement prioritization (tiering) even when neutrality is welfare superior.
Driving much of our results is the endogeneity of household consumption
decisions. Just as on a physical highway, where cars abandon slow-moving
lanes for fast-moving lanes, giving priority to some content over other will cause
households to consume more of the former and less of the latter ceteris paribus.
It is this ability of households to adjust their consumption that explains, in
part, Proposition 1: the fact that households choose how to allocate the greater
content that one division of bandwidth provides over another means households
will tend to prefer the former division to the latter. An additional force behind
Proposition 1 is that content providers’ proﬁts are increasing in total content
sold.
An issue in the network neutrality debate is whether relaxing the neutrality
requirement would provide isps greater incentives to increase bandwidth. We
consider that issue in Section 5. Unlike earlier work (e.g., Choi and Kim), which
found allowing an isp to discriminate had ambiguous eﬀects on its incentives to
increase bandwidth, we ﬁnd an ability to discriminate unambiguously results in
the isp installing greater bandwidth. This eﬀect is welfare enhancing. Whether
it is strong enough to counter-balance the static ineﬃciency of discrimination
is ambiguous: we derive results that suggest that when household utility is a
signiﬁcantly greater component of welfare than content providers’ proﬁts, then
network neutrality can still be the welfare superior policy even accounting for
the isp’s bandwidth-building incentives.
6In theory, second-degree price discrimination via quality tiering is not necessarily the
only form of price discrimination that could be relevant. In particular, it has been suggested
to us that residential isps could engage in perfect discrimination vis-` a-vis content providers
because, for instance, isps like Verizon and Comcast can identify what content comes from
content providers like Google and Amazon. Hence, an isp should charge an access fee to
each content provider exactly equal to that provider’s proﬁt from transacting with the isp’s
residential customers (e.g., Verizon should charge Amazon an access fee equal to 100% of
all Amazon’s proﬁts earned transacting with Verizon’s residential customers). We discuss
the possibility of such perfect discrimination in greater depth in Section 4, but note, at this
juncture, that there are reasons to doubt such discrimination is truly feasible or permissible;
indeed, to the best of our knowledge, no isp has ever sought permission to engage in such
ﬁrm-speciﬁc pricing.Model 5
Like any model, some assumptions are necessary to make the analysis tract-
able. We explore relaxing these assumptions in Section 6. We show there that
our primary results can continue to hold if we allow the isp to unit-price content
(Section 6.1); if households are heterogeneous in their preferences or if diﬀerent
households consume diﬀerent content entirely (Section 6.2); if content providers
vary in terms of their marginal costs and advertising rates (Section 6.3); and
when we consider a variety of diﬀerent assumptions for the household utility
function (Section 6.4). In particular, via an example, we show that our main
ﬁnding—the possibility that network neutrality is welfare maximizing among
the feasible (implementable) tiering schemes (Proposition 5)—can still hold
given a very diﬀerent demand structure.
2 Model
2.1 Structure and Technology
Figure 1 shows the basic structure and technology we have in mind. House-
holds want to engage with content (or application) providers. These providers’
content must pass through a “pipe” controlled by a monopoly, the isp, to reach
households. The pipe has a bandwidth, B. This should be interpreted as there
being the capacity for B “units” of content (e.g., packets) to go from the con-
tent providers to the households per unit of time. We assume that the isp can
dedicate portions of the bandwidth or otherwise guarantee priority to diﬀerent
content providers or groups of providers; that is, it can divide the bandwidth
into B1,...,BJ sub-bandwidths, where
 J
j=1 Bj = B (or do the equivalent
thereof via the granting of priority).7
We assume a continuum of content providers of measure one, indexed by
θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ) ⊆ R+. The distribution of θ is F : [θ, ¯ θ) → [0,1]. Assume the
derivative F′( ) exists and is positive for all θ ∈ (θ, ¯ θ). As a slight abuse of
notation, we will sometimes write F(Θ) to denote the proportion of application-
provider types that are in set Θ.
Let X(θ) denote the units of content sent by content provider θ. If Θ ⊂ [θ, ¯ θ)





is the time necessary to send all of the content of those content providers in Θ.
Observe t(Θ) is a measure of the congestion faced by content providers in Θ
and we will treat it as such in what follows. We use τ(θ) to denote the delivery
time of content provider θ’s content. If θ is in Θ, then τ(θ) = t(Θ).
7In particular, this formulation is equivalent to one in which an isp guarantees average
transmission speeds. To see this, a content provider’s average speed equals content ÷ total




Figure 1: Schematic representation of technology.
2.2 Consumers and Content Providers
Assume there is a continuum of households (consumers) of measure one. Each
household potentially engages in trade with each content provider. We assume
a household’s utility is quasi-linear and additively separable over the content
from diﬀerent providers. A household’s marginal utility from the xth unit of













, reﬂects the congestion in transmission,
τ(θ), some indication of the value the household assigns that content, and how
much the household cares about delay or congestion vis-` a-vis that content.8 A
household’s overall utility is
U = y +
  ¯ θ
θ












where y is the num´ eraire good and x(θ) is its consumption of the θth provider’s
good (number of packets bought).





because it is particularly tractable. In Section 6.4, we show, via an example, that assuming
(1) is not necessary for establishing that network neutrality can be superior to any feasible
discrimination scheme.Model 7
Speciﬁcation (2) embeds a number of assumptions, which we discuss in depth
in Section 6. As we demonstrate there, the assumption of additive separability
across diﬀerent content, a common assumption in the literature, can be justiﬁed
as a reasonable approximation to more general utility functions (see, in particu-
lar, Section 6.4). Another embedded assumption is that households are homoge-
nous in their preferences. This assumption is made primarily for convenience;
as we show in Section 6.2, our principal results—Propositions 1–5—continue to
hold even when households have heterogenous preferences (including wishing to
consume diﬀerent types of content).
We assume marginal utility, m( ), is twice diﬀerentiable and decreasing. We
assume, further, that marginal utility is never “too convex”; speciﬁcally, we
assume
zm′′(z) + m′(z) < 0 (3)
for all z ∈ R+. We assume that households prefer faster content delivery to
slower content delivery ceteris paribus; that is, τ > τ′ implies α(τ,θ) < α(τ′,θ)
for all θ. We further assume that households view content from higher-θ content
providers to be more time sensitive than from lower-θ content providers; that
is, for all θ > θ′ and all τ > τ′,
α(τ,θ) − α(τ′,θ) < α(τ,θ′) − α(τ′,θ′) (4)
(in other words, α exhibits decreasing diﬀerences). At this juncture, we make
no assumptions about how α varies with content type, θ, holding time constant.
We assume that consumption of the content providers’ goods plus any hookup
fee paid the isp never consumes a household’s entire income. This and the as-
sumption of additively separable and quasi-linear utility mean that each house-
hold acquires the amount of the θth content provider’s product that equates











(Note the implicit deﬁnition of ω : R+ → R+.) Observe demand for content falls
with congestion. Expression (5) plays a key role in the analysis that follows,
so it is worth pausing to interpret it. This expression embodies the highly
plausible assumption that demand for any particular type of content increases
if that content is delivered more quickly; where the rate of increase in demand
depends on what the content is (i.e., the eﬀect on the demands for content θ′
and θ′′ from the same change in delivery time may vary). An issue, though, is
how this demand eﬀect should be modeled. Here, it is, essentially, a counter-
clockwise rotation of demand. Alternatively it could, say, be modeled as a
parallel shift out in demand. Our assumption of rotational (multiplicative)
change makes the ensuing analysis highly tractable, albeit at the loss of some
generality. In Section 6.4 we show, via a particular example, that our main
result, Proposition 5, is still applicable when the eﬀect of faster delivery is a
parallel shift out in demand rather than a rotation.
A content provider’s proﬁt is
(q + p − c)x(p,θ) − s,Welfare 8
where q is the advertising rate, c is the marginal cost of content production and
transmission, and s is a payment to the isp. Observe, we are assuming that the
advertising rate and content cost are common across content providers.9
Assumption (3) implies ω( ) is log concave. To rule out inﬁnite consumption,
assume that limp↓c−q ω(p) < ∞.10 These assumptions are thus suﬃcient for a
content provider’s pricing problem,
max
p (q + p − c)x(p,θ) − s, (6)
to have a unique and ﬁnite solution. Observe that solving (6) is equivalent to
solving
max
p (q + p − c)ω(p);




q + p∗ − c
 
ω(p∗);




π − s. We refer to π
as the “equilibrium gross proﬁt factor.”













(Note the implicit deﬁnition of σ—the “equilibrium consumer surplus factor.”)
Total welfare, the sum of content providers’ proﬁts and households’ consumer
surplus, is
W =







9Assuming q and c to be common across content providers is a reasonable ﬁrst-order ap-
proximation because there is a competitive market for advertising and the contents’ marginal
costs are often the same, zero. Like any approximation, though, it is imperfect and there are
exceptions (e.g., video or audio resellers who must pay signiﬁcant royalties per item). Even
then, there is a certain robustness to our analysis: as we show in Section 6.3, the paper’s pri-
mary results hold even if q − c varies across content providers provided that diﬀerence varies
independently of the household preference parameter θ.
10An alternative assumption would be to require limp↓0 ω(p) < ∞ and to assume p ≥ 0; the
latter condition matches reality insofar as practical issues generally preclude websites, even
those that make money through advertising, from paying their visitors.
11That each content provider’s price is independent of its type is both a positive and negative
from a modeling perspective. It is a positive, insofar as it allows us to abstract away from the
eﬀects that changes in tiering might cause in content providers’ pricing. On the other hand,
a common price is unrealistic. In Section 6.3 we show that some extensions of the model that
yield diﬀerent prices across content providers can be entertained without changing our results.Welfare 9
3 Welfare
Let Θ1,...,ΘN denote a partition of [θ, ¯ θ) such that each Θn is measurable with
respect to F. Let Bn denote the bandwidth allocated to Θn (
 N
n=1 Bn = B).















n=1 Bntn equals the total amount of content, X, sent in equi-
librium given this division of the bandwidth.
Consider two partitions, Θ1,...,ΘN and   Θ1,...,   ΘM, and corresponding
bandwidth allocations B1,...,BN and ˜ B1,..., ˜ BM, respectively. Denote t(Θn)





























˜ Bm˜ tm =
π + σ
ω(p∗)
  X . (10)
Comparing (9) to (10), the following result is immediate:
Proposition 1. Given two alternative divisions of the total bandwidth, one is
welfare superior to the other if and only if it results in more content being carried
in equilibrium than the other.
An obvious, but important corollary is
Corollary 1. Network neutrality is welfare superior (at least weakly) to any
division of the bandwidth if and only if no division of the bandwidth leads to
more content being sent in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 and its corollary are reminiscent of the result that a neces-
sary condition for third-degree price discrimination to increase welfare vis-` a-vis
uniform pricing is that price discrimination increase the total amount sold vis-
` a-vis the amount sold under uniform pricing (see, e.g., Varian, 1985, 1989).
Our results diﬀer from the results concerning third-degree price discrimination
because here purchasers face diﬀerent transmission times rather than, as under
third-degree price discrimination, diﬀerent prices. There is a certain analogy
between transmission times and prices insofar as utility is decreasing in both.
However, unlike in the analysis of third-degree price discrimination, there is
no general fundamental identity analogous, say, to Roy’s identity, which would
link transmission speed and welfare. Consequently, our analysis cannot be as
general, in terms of utility functions, as Varian (1985, 1989).Welfare 10
It might at ﬁrst seem odd that total content sent is a suﬃcient statistic for
deciding among diﬀerent bandwidth allocations and that how the bandwidth
is allocated is not an explicit part of Proposition 1. To better understand this
result, observe that households adjust their consumption to achieve the same
marginal utility across the content of the diﬀerent content providers in equilib-



























0 m(x)dx. Given (11), it follows that welfare is
W =








+ (q − c)x(θ)
 
dF(θ) ∝
  ¯ θ
θ
x(θ)dF(θ) = X ;
that is, welfare is in ﬁxed proportion to the total amount of content sent.
Yet another interpretation is the following. Households are free to adjust
their consumption. From the perspective of the households, more total content
is similar to more total income in a conventional consumer-choice model: more
income is better than less because a consumer is free to allocate that income
as she sees ﬁt. Similarly, more content will tend to make households better oﬀ
because they can allocate it as they see ﬁt. Additionally, content providers’
gross proﬁts increase in the amount they sell by a constant factor. It is not
surprising then that welfare increases in the amount of content carried.
An ongoing policy debate is whether residential isps should be permitted
to block certain traﬃc. For example it has been alleged that the American
isp Comcast blocked BitTorrent.12 As a rationale for actions that might hin-
der BitTorrent, Comcast cited congestion alleviation.13 It is, therefore, worth
considering whether welfare can be improved by blocking some content while
providing remaining content a common level of service.
Proposition 2. Suppose the isp provides a common class of service, but ex-
cludes a positive measure of content providers. In the resulting equilibrium,
welfare is less than it would be were no content providers excluded.
Proof: Let the excluded content belong to Θex and the non-excluded content
to Θin, Θex ∪ Θin = [θ, ¯ θ). By assumption, F(Θex) > 0.
Suppose, contrary to the proposition, that welfare given the exclusion of Θex
was not less than it would be under network neutrality (i.e., no exclusion). It
12See “Comcast Blocks some Internet Traﬃc,” an Associated Press article by Peter Svens-
son, October 19, 2007. Accessed on the msnbc web site.
13Source: ibid.Welfare 11
follows from Proposition 1 that if ˆ X is total content carried in equilibrium given
exclusion and X is total content carried in equilibrium under neutrality, then
ˆ X ≥ X . (12)
Let ˆ t and t∗ be the equilibrium transmission times under exclusion and neutral-








Hence, α(ˆ t,θ) ≤ α(t∗,θ) for all θ. This yields
ˆ X = ω(p∗)
 
Θin





  ¯ θ
θ
α(t∗,θ)dF(θ) = X . (13)
But (13) contradicts (12). The result follows reductio ad absurdum.
Intuitively, the only way for welfare to increase is if more content is traded.
But trading more content necessarily increases a common transmission time,
which reduces demand. Hence, it is impossible to increase welfare by excluding
some content: the excluded content is no longer traded and, as just shown, the
volume of the non-excluded content traded in equilibrium cannot exceed the
total volume traded under neutrality.14
The next issue is deriving conditions that allow us to determine whether
dividing the bandwidth (tiering service) increases or decreases total content
sent. To that end, assume α( , ) is twice diﬀerentiable in both arguments.15
Observe that the bandwidth used by content θ is x(θ)/τ(θ)×dF(θ). The overall
bandwidth constraint can, thus, be written as




dF(θ) = B . (14)
When households can adjust consumption, welfare is given by (7) above and,




ω(p∗), the bandwidth constraint (14) can be
written as
ω(p∗)







dF(θ) = B . (14′)
14The reader may question this conclusion on the grounds that we have assumed homoge-
nous households, worrying that the use of, say, BitTorrent represents an externality imposed
by certain types of households on other types of households. As we show in Section 6.2,
this concern is misplaced: Proposition 2 holds even if we extend the analysis to account for
heterogeneous households (see, in particular, Proposition 15 infra).
15At the end of this section, we present an alternative analysis that does not rely on calculus.
See Proposition 4 infra.Welfare 12
Let λ denote the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint. The Lagrangean asso-
ciated with constrained welfare maximization is





















      
Z
with respect to τ(θ). The term labeled Z must be positive because otherwise the
expression would be maximized by allocating inﬁnite time, but allocating inﬁnite
time guarantees Z is positive; reductio ad absurdum, Z > 0. Maximization















Assuming (16) has an interior maximum, it follows from well-known comparative-
statics results that the τ(θ) that maximizes (16) is increasing in θ if the cross-
partial derivative of (16) with respect to θ and τ(θ) is positive; it is decreasing
in θ if that cross-partial derivative is negative; and it is constant if that cross-
partial is everywhere zero. The sign of the cross-partial derivative of (16) is the








The sign of the cross-partial derivative of (17) is a statement about how the
elasticity of demand for content with respect to transmission time varies across




















This establishes that the crucial determinant of how content should be priori-
tized (if at all) depends on how transmission-time elastic demand is for diﬀerent
content. Formally, we have:
Proposition 3. Suppose the elasticity of demand for content with respect to
transmission time is monotone in content type holding time constant (i.e.,
∂ǫ(τ,θ)/∂θ has a common sign for all τ and θ). Then if, for all times, the
elasticity of demand for content θ with respect to transmission time exceeds that
of content θ′ (i.e., ǫ(τ,θ) > ǫ(τ,θ′) all τ), a welfare-maximizing allocation of
bandwidth across content providers is such that the equilibrium transmission
time for θ content is shorter than for θ′ content (i.e., τ(θ) < τ(θ′)). If the
elasticity of demand with respect to transmission time is invariant with respect
to content type, then network neutrality is welfare maximizing.Welfare 13
As intuition, suppose, initially, that content θ and θ′ had the same delivery
times. Suppose, too, that demand for content θ is more transmission-time elastic
than for content θ′; that is, the equilibrium consumption of content θ is more
aﬀected by a change in delivery time than is the equilibrium consumption of
content θ′. Then shifting bandwidth to θ from θ′—that is, reducing the delivery
time for θ but increasing it for θ′—would increase total content traded because
the increase in trade of θ would more than oﬀset the reduction in the trade
of θ′. Such a shift would be welfare enhancing because total content traded
is a suﬃcient statistic for welfare (Proposition 1). The result, Proposition 3,
follows. In many ways, this result is reminiscent of optimal Ramsey pricing
(except, here, diﬀerent users face diﬀerent times, not prices).
It is important to recognize that the assumption that higher-θ content is
more time sensitive (i.e., that ∂
2α
∂θ∂τ < 0) does not imply demand for that content

























In other words, it is possible that welfare can be maximized by retarding more
time-sensitive content in favor of less time-sensitive content.
This last possibility may, at ﬁrst, seem perverse. It is, however, a possibility
because households adjust their consumption. Hence, as noted, what matters
is the time-elasticity of demand. Given that need not coincide with time sensi-
tivity, as deﬁned by (4), there is no reason why welfare maximization requires
speeding the delivery of more time-sensitive content at the expense of less time-
sensitive content.
An alternative analysis, which does not rely on calculus, is feasible when
the identity (8) can be solved for tn.16 To that end, suppose that α can be
decomposed as
α(τ,θ) = γ(τ)v(θ), (18)
where, consistent with earlier assumptions, γ( ) > 0, v( ) > 0, γ( ) decreasing,
and v( ) increasing. Assume v( ) is measurable and γ( ) is continuous on R+.
Deﬁne g(t) = t/γ(t). Because γ( ) is decreasing, g( ) is a strictly increasing
function. It follows that g( ) has an inverse, g−1( ) and that this inverse is
also an increasing function. Given that g(t) is formed by multiplying t with an
increasing positive function, it is not unreasonable to assume further that g( )
is convex.17 If g( ) is convex, it follows that g−1( ) is concave. The solution to
16Observe the leftmost term in (8) is linearly increasing in tn, while the rightmost term is
decreasing in tn; hence, if (8) has a solution in tn, it is unique.
17Although xψ(x) is not necessarily convex on R+ for all increasing functions ψ : R+ → R+
(e.g., x
￿
1 + (x − 1)3￿
is not convex), xψ(x) will be convex for a large set of ψ(·) including











Given neutrality (no bandwidth division), the equilibrium time to send all con-










We can now establish:
Proposition 4. Suppose the adjustment function, α(τ,θ), is multiplicatively
separable in delivery time and type (i.e., is given by (18)). Suppose too the
function deﬁned by t  → t/γ(t) is a convex function. Then network neutrality is
welfare superior to any division of the bandwidth and strictly welfare superior to
any division that either excludes some measurable segment of content providers
or results in diﬀerent groups of content providers’ having their content being
sent with diﬀerent transmission times in equilibrium.
The proof, which uses Jensen’s inequality to show that total content under neu-
trality exceeds total content under any division, can be found in the appendix.
Note if v( ) and γ( ) are diﬀerentiable, then (18) implies the elasticity of demand
with respect to time is constant across content types; that is, Proposition 4 is
consistent with Proposition 3.
4 Residential ISPs Charging Content Providers
In this section, we focus on the incentives of the residential isp to charge content
providers for carrying their content the “last mile” to households (the isp’s
subscribers). In particular, we wish to compare the isp’s private incentives with
what would be welfare maximizing.
A possible pricing regime would be one in which the isp sets a common fee,
s, to content providers and provides those who paid it a common level of service.
If a positive measure of content providers chose not to pay, then welfare would
necessarily be reduced by Proposition 2. To summarize:
Corollary 2. Suppose the isp provides a common class of service, but charges
any content provider that wishes access to its subscribers (households) an access
fee s > 0. If, in the resulting equilibrium, a set of content providers of posi-
tive measure choose not to purchase access, then welfare would be increased by
prohibiting the isp from charging such an access fee.
On one hand, Corollary 2 might not seem surprising: after all, it is well known
that monopoly pricing that excludes buyers willing to pay more than a good’s
marginal cost is welfare reducing. On the other hand, while the isp’s monetary
cost is zero, there is a social marginal cost due to congestion. As is well known,
pricing to exclude low value uses can be a way to raise welfare in the face ofCharging Content Providers 15
congestion. In this light, Corollary 2 is not obvious. The result holds because
households already internalize congestion in making their purchase decisions
and, hence, it is impossible to create a beneﬁt vis-` a-vis congestion alleviation
by excluding content providers.
In the network neutrality debate, an issue has been whether more sophisti-
cated pricing by residential isps to the content providers should be permitted.
Central to this debate has been second-degree price discrimination via priori-
tized service; that is, diﬀerential prices for diﬀerential classes (tiers) of service.18
We now turn to such pricing.
An immediate consequence of our deﬁnition of time sensitivity, expression
(4), is the following result.
Lemma 1. Suppose there are two tiers of service with corresponding equilibrium
transmission times t and t′, t > t′. Suppose the isp charges content providers s
and s′, respectively, for the diﬀerent tiers. Consider two content-provider types
θ and θ′, θ > θ′. Then if the low-type θ′ prefers the faster tier t′ at price s′
(i.e., πα(t′,θ′) − s′ ≥ πα(t,θ′) − s), the higher-type θ strictly prefers the faster
tier t′ at price s′ (i.e., πα(t′,θ) − s′ > πα(t,θ) − s).
A reasonable assumption is that there is no demand for content that will
never be delivered (equivalently, that has been allocated no bandwidth). We
thus maintain the following assumption henceforth.
Assumption 1. For all content types θ, limτ→∞ α(τ,θ) = 0.
Given this assumption, a content provider that chooses not to purchase access
to an isp’s subscribers can be considered to have “purchased” inﬁnite delay at
a price of zero. This insight and Lemma 1 yield the following result.
Corollary 3. If a lower type of content provider is willing to pay for access to
an isp’s subscribers (i.e., buy a tier of service with ﬁnite transmission time),
then a higher type strictly prefers to pay for access.
In other words, if pricing by the isp causes some content providers to exit, it
will be the lowest-type content providers that exit.
A well-known consequence of Lemma 1 and Corollary 3 is that any feasible
(i.e., incentive compatible) price discrimination scheme that the isp can em-
ploy vis-` a-vis the content providers must have the feature that, in equilibrium,
quality (i.e., speed) is everywhere non-decreasing in type; hence, τ( ) is nec-
essarily a non-increasing function.19 Such an allocation of transmission times
cannot be better—but could be worse—than network neutrality if Proposition 4
applies or if the time-elasticity of demand is non-increasing in content type
(Proposition 3). When conditions satisfy Proposition 4, this conclusion follows
because network neutrality is welfare maximizing. When the time-elasticity
18At the end of this section, we brieﬂy discuss other forms of price discrimination.
19See, for example, Chapter 3 of Tirole (1988) for why quality must be non-decreasing in
type under incentive-compatible second-degree price discrimination.Charging Content Providers 16
of demand is decreasing with content type, this conclusion follows because a
feasible scheme (in which τ( ) is non-increasing) goes in the opposite direction
relative to the welfare-maximizing scheme (in which τ( ) is increasing); that
is, network neutrality is closer to the welfare-maximizing scheme than would a
feasible discrimination scheme. To summarize:
Proposition 5. Let the adjustment function α be twice diﬀerentiable in its
arguments. Suppose the elasticity of demand with respect to transmission time
is non-increasing in content type holding time constant (i.e., ∂ǫ(τ,θ)/∂θ ≤ 0 for
all τ and θ). Then any feasible price discrimination (tiered service) scheme that
the isp can implement vis-` a-vis the content providers will be welfare inferior to
network neutrality.
Alternatively, let the adjustment function α satisfy the assumptions of Propo-
sition 4. Then any feasible price discrimination scheme that the isp can imple-
ment vis-` a-vis the content providers will be welfare inferior to network neutrality.
It is, however, important to note that if the time-elasticity of demand is increas-
ing in content type (i.e., ∂ǫ(τ,θ)/∂θ > 0), then there is an incentive-compatible
prioritization scheme that is welfare superior to network neutrality. On the
other hand, as a general rule, the welfare-maximizing scheme will not maximize
the isp’s proﬁt; hence, the answer to the question, “Will the isp adopt a price
discrimination scheme that is welfare superior to network neutrality when the
time-elasticity of demand is increasing in content type?” is it depends: one can-
not guarantee that discrimination will be welfare superior because it is possible
that the isp could “over do it.”
Knowledge that a pricing scheme could be welfare inferior to neutrality is
meaningful only if the isp would pursue such pricing if not otherwise restrained.
Given that one cannot be sure that a monopolist will price in a less-than-welfare-
maximizing manner even in the simplest of monopoly settings,20 it cannot be
that always restraining the isp is welfare improving. In what follows, therefore,
we focus on a few cases that demonstrate the possibility that the isp would
impose non-neutral schemes in situations in which neutrality would be welfare
superior; that is, cases in which restraining the isp would be welfare improving.
In considering the isp’s pricing to the content providers, we need also to be
mindful that this is a two-sided market and, hence, be cognizant of the eﬀect
of the isp’s pricing to content providers on the prices it can charge households.
The assumption that households are homogenous means that the isp can fully
capture a household’s equilibrium net beneﬁt from trade with content providers.




max{0,2 − p}, if p > 1
1, if p ≤ 1
(as would arise if a given consumer wanted at most one unit and the distribution of consumers’
willingnesses to pay was uniform on [1,2]). It is readily seen the proﬁt-maximizing price is
p = 1, a price at which welfare is a maximum.Charging Content Providers 17
Hence, the hookup fee, η, will equal
σ












where W is equilibrium welfare. The hookup fee is thus a constant proportion
of equilibrium total welfare. The isp will thus internalize, to an extent, overall
welfare.
An immediate consequence of this analysis of pricing to households is the
following.
Proposition 6. Suppose the isp’s pricing scheme to content providers is not
welfare maximizing, then the imposition of restrictions on the isp vis-` a-vis its
pricing to content providers that raise welfare will lead to higher hookup fees for
households.
This result has a possible political-economy implication: the isp can credibly
promise a lower household hookup fee should restrictions on charging content
providers be lifted, which could create political pressure to lift those restrictions.
Of course, this argument presumes a certain na¨ ıvit´ e on the part of households
since, in equilibrium, they capture no surplus and should, thus, be indiﬀerent as
to how residential isps’ pricing to content providers is regulated. That noted,
one could view Proposition 6 as a “shorthand” for an analysis in which household
heterogeneity means some households would strictly beneﬁt from restrictions
being lifted because they would no longer be priced out of Internet access or
would see their surplus increase.
We return now to the question of how, given the ﬂexibility, a residential
isp would price discriminate to content providers. If the isp can discriminate
continuously across content providers, then, following well-known techniques, it
will impose the scheme that maximizes expected virtual surplus subject to (i)
τ( )’s being non-increasing and (ii) the bandwidth constraint (14′). In terms of
notation, it seeks to maximize
σ
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where f( ) is the density function associated with the distribution function F( ),
subject to τ( )’s being non-increasing and the bandwidth constraint. Equiva-
lently, we can express this program as maximizing the Lagragean
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f(θ)dθ (23)Charging Content Providers 18
subject to τ( )’s being non-increasing. It is straightforward to see that maxi-
mizing (23) will not, in general, lead to neutrality.
For example, if α(τ,θ) = θ/τ, which satisﬁes Proposition 4, and F( ) is the
















  , if θ > π
σ+2π
. (24)
Clearly, in this case, what is proﬁt-maximizing for the isp, speciﬁcally departing
from neutrality, is not welfare-maximizing.
In the current network neutrality debate, much of the discussion concerns a
ﬁnite number of tiers (as opposed to “continuous” discrimination). Even when
limited in this way, a residential isp can still have an incentive to discriminate in
a welfare-reducing manner. To demonstrate this, suppose the isp can oﬀer two
services: high-speed, denoted by an h subscript, and low-speed, denoted by an
ℓ subscript. Let r (for rate) denote an arbitrary element of {ℓ,h}. The quantity
tr is the time required, in equilibrium, to send all content of those content
providers that subscribe to service r. In keeping with their names, th < tℓ. Let
sr be the access fee that the isp charges content providers for service r. Because,
otherwise, there would eﬀectively be only one service, sh > sℓ.
In deciding which, if any, service to purchase, a content provider chooses the
largest of
0, α(tℓ,θ)π − sℓ , or α(th,θ)π − sh .
Let 0 denote “no service” and consider the services ordered h ≻ ℓ ≻ 0. The
following result follows immediately from Lemma 1 and Assumption 1 and the
proof is, therefore, omitted.
Lemma 2. Let θ > θ′ and r ≻ r′. Then a θ′-type content provider’s preferring
r to r′ implies a θ-type content provider prefers r to r′. Conversely, a θ-type
content provider’s preferring r′ to r implies a θ′-type content provider prefers r′
to r.
If there is discrimination in equilibrium, then the previous lemma implies
there are two cut-oﬀ types, θℓ and θh, with θ ≤ θℓ < θh < ¯ θ, such that types
θ ≥ θh purchase the h service, types θ ∈ [θℓ,θh) purchase the ℓ service, and
types θ < θℓ purchase no service. Observe that







α(th,θh) − α(tℓ,θh) + α(tℓ,θℓ)
 
π . (25)
Because the analysis is greatly facilitated if we can solve the identity (8)
for tr, suppose that α(τ,θ) is multiplicatively separable as speciﬁed in (18).
21The Mathematica program used to derive this solution is available from authors upon
request.Charging Content Providers 19
As before v( ) is increasing and γ( ) is decreasing. Assume both functions are




v(θ)dF(θ) and G(z) = g−1(z).
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. (26)
Deﬁne ˆ θ as the θ that solves I(θ,θ) = I(θ, ¯ θ). It is readily seen that a solution
must exist and, moreover, is unique. Suppose there is network neutrality (all
content providers served under a common service), but the isp charges content
providers an access fee s = πα(t∗,θ) = πv(θ)γ(t∗). This is the most proﬁtable
situation, given neutrality and no exclusion, for the isp. Observe it is equivalent
to the following trivial tiering arrangement: Bℓ = Bh = B/2, sℓ = sh =
v(θ)γ(t∗), θℓ = θ, and θh = ˆ θ. We can now establish:
Proposition 7. Suppose the adjustment function, α(τ,θ), is multiplicatively
separable in delay time and type (i.e., is given by (18)) with both functions
diﬀerentiable. Then the residential isp will strictly prefer not to implement
network neutrality.
Proof: Consider two cases. In the ﬁrst v(θ) > 0. Observe that a feasible
deviation from network neutrality is for the isp to raise θh above ˆ θ (maintaining
the same bandwidth allocation between the two segments). The derivative of
the ﬁrst line of (26) with respect to θh is positive, while the derivatives of the
second and third lines, given θh = ˆ θ, are each zero. Hence, the isp will wish to
deviate from network neutrality.
As a second case, suppose v(θ) = 0. An option for the isp is to eschew
tiering, but charge a positive access fee (i.e., s > 0) for a common class of
service. Setting s > 0 is equivalent to raising the lowest content type served. As
this will exclude some content providers, it violates network neutrality. Under
such a single-tiered service, the isp’s proﬁt is given by (26), except θh = ¯ θ. TheCharging Content Providers 20












    
=0
f(θ) > 0.
Hence, in this case too, the isp will wish to deviate from network neutrality.
An immediate corollary to Propositions 4 and 7 is the following.
Corollary 4. Suppose the adjustment function, α(τ,θ), is multiplicatively sep-
arable in delay time and type (i.e., is given by (18)) with both functions diﬀer-
entiable. Suppose too the function deﬁned by t  → t/γ(t) is a convex function.
Then an unconstrained isp will not price in a manner that maximizes welfare.
An issue related to the above analysis is the following: Suppose full network
neutrality were not an option; rather, suppose the policy choice was between
allowing the isp freedom to engage in second-degree price discrimination or
allowing it to set a positive price for a common level of service. An earlier version
of this paper (available from the authors upon request) explored that choice in
depth. The answer is that, depending on the exact assumptions, either policy
could be the welfare superior one. In large measure, this ambiguity reﬂects the
usual ambiguity as to whether second-degree price discrimination on the basis
of quality is welfare superior or inferior to linear pricing (see, e.g., Hermalin and
Katz, 2007).
As remarked in footnote 6 supra, a theoretical possibility is the isp could
engage in perfect discrimination vis-` a-vis the content providers. If the isp can
engage in perfect discrimination, then it will charge a type-θ content provider





π. Consequently, the isp’s total proﬁt (including from households)







which matches expression (7), total welfare. The following result is, therefore,
immediate:
Proposition 8. If the isp can engage in perfect discrimination vis-` a-vis all
content providers, then the isp will choose the bandwidth allocation (service
prioritization) that maximizes welfare.
Proposition 8 is, of course, a well-known result in the two-sided-markets lit-
erature: If the platform captures 100% of the surplus from both sides of the
market, the platform will act in the welfare-maximizing manner.
There are a number of reasons why one might wish to be skeptical of the
practical implications of Proposition 8. First, such discrimination would require
the isp to possess and process a tremendous amount of information. With hun-
dreds of millions of content providers, implementation of perfect discriminationDynamic Issues 21
is likely infeasible.22 Possible evidence to its infeasibility is that, while isps
have sought (or claimed) the regulatory right to engage in second-degree price
discrimination via prioritization, to the best of our knowledge none has ever
sought or attempted to engage in ﬁrm-speciﬁc (perfect) discriminatory pricing
towards the content providers.
Second, current regulations would appear to prohibit isps from pricing in
such a manner. For instance, ﬁrm-speciﬁc discrimination—essentially blocking a
content provider from access to an isp’s residential customers unless the content
provider paid the isp 100% of the proﬁts the content provider earns from trans-
acting with the isp’s residential customers—seems extremely unlikely to pass
the fcc’s “reasonableness” test concerning discriminatory practices by isps.23
Admittedly, regulations change, but permitting isps to engage in ﬁrm-speciﬁc
discrimination seems not only not to be at the center of the current network
neutrality debate, we see no evidence that it is even on the radar screen.
One reason it may not be part of the debate—and a third reason to question
the practical importance of Proposition 8—is that were isps able to price in
such a manner, the dynamic consequences would be fairly severe: Because an
existing or would-be content provider would face complete holdup by the isps,
it would have no incentive to invest or innovate. Hence, the static eﬃciency
of Proposition 8 ignores the signiﬁcant dynamic ineﬃciency that such holdup
would induce.24
5 Dynamic Issues
The analysis to this point has treated bandwidth, B, as an exogenously given
constant. In reality, the isp determines B via its investments in capacity. In
this section, we brieﬂy consider the implications of various pricing regimes on
the isp’s incentives to invest in bandwidth.
For convenience, we assume the marginal cost of bandwidth expansion to
be a constant κ > 0. We assume there is no possibility of the residential isp’s
shutting down, so we ignore ﬁxed costs.
An unconstrained isp faces the same optimization problem as (23) above,
except now it is concerned with the true cost of bandwidth rather than its
22As a simplifying assumption, we have assumed that households potentially interact with
all content providers, which suggests that each household knows who all the content providers
are. However, as we show in Section 6.2, this assumption can readily be relaxed; that is, each
household potentially interacts with an idiosyncratic subset of all the content providers. In
other words, our results do not require that households be more sophisticated than isps—no
content provider needs to be known to all households.
23See fcc 10–201, released December 23, 2010. One of the principles it sets forth (see
paragraph 1) is “no unreasonable discrimination.” See also paragraphs 6, 35, 43, and Section
III.C.
24That complete holdup, of the sort represented by perfect discrimination, would destroy all
investment incentives is well known (see, e.g., Williamson, 1975, 1976; and Tirole, 1986), the
eﬀect of partial holdup, as would result from imperfect (e.g., second-degree) discrimination,
on investment incentives is more ambiguous—see Hermalin and Katz (2009) and the citations
therein.Dynamic Issues 22
shadow cost; that is, the λ in (23) is replaced with κ. The solution must
still satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraint that delivery times be non-
increasing in type (i.e., τ( ) must still be non-increasing).
Comparing overall welfare under the solution to this price-discrimination
program to welfare when the isp is constrained to oﬀer a common level of
service is impossible at a general level. We therefore limit attention to a set of
tractable functional forms. Speciﬁcally, suppose that α(τ,θ) = θ/τ and F is the
uniform distribution on [0,1]. The suitably modiﬁed version of program (23) is,
thus, choose τ( ) to maximize
  ¯ θ
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subject to τ( ) non-increasing. Solving that program yields:
τ(θ) =
 




(2π+σ)θ−π , if θ > π
σ+2π
. (28)
It follows that the unconstrained isp would build bandwidth:
Bun = ω(p∗)























The situation in which the isp is subject to network neutrality (non-exclusion
and common service) is equivalent, in this example, to the situation in which
there is no network-neutrality constraint, but π = 0. Hence, its objective re-
mains to maximize (27) (with π set to 0). From (28), it follows the solution is





Because 2log(2) > 1, it is readily seen that Bun > Bn; that is, the isp installs
more bandwidth when unconstrained than when subject to network neutrality.
Welfare, including the variable cost of bandwidth, is, from (7) and (14′),
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under network neutrality. Depending on the parameter values for π and σ, (29)
can be greater or less than (30); that is, once the isp’s investment incentives
are considered, network neutrality can still be welfare maximizing, but is not
guaranteed to be so. Letting σ = ζπ, it can be shown that (29) is not less than
(30) if and only if
4 + 3ζ − 2(2 + ζ)log(2 + ζ) ≥ 0.
Solving for the smallest ζ that satisﬁes that expression, we ﬁnd that








   
≈ 1.314, (31)






Proposition 9. Suppose the adjustment function, α(τ,θ), is θ/τ, the distri-
bution of content types is uniform on [0,1], and the isp’s marginal cost of ad-
ditional bandwidth is a constant. Then an unconstrained isp will install more
bandwidth than an isp subject to network neutrality. Welfare will be greater
under network neutrality if the consumer surplus factor, σ, exceeds ζ times the
gross proﬁt factor, π, where the constant ζ is given by (31).
Proposition 9 indicates that there could be a fundamental distinction be-
tween eﬃcient policy in a static setting and one in a dynamic setting. The
greater bandwidth installed by an unconstrained isp is welfare enhancing ce-
teris paribus. On the other hand, there is still the static ineﬃciency that can
arise from tiering. A priori, it is impossible to know which eﬀect dominates.
Proposition 9 reaches a somewhat diﬀerent conclusion than reached by Choi
and Kim (2010) concerning the eﬀect of permitting price discrimination on the
isp’s bandwidth investment incentives. Proposition 9 predicts permitting price
discrimination increases bandwidth unambiguously. In Choi and Kim’s article,
the eﬀect is ambiguous; in particular, permitting price discrimination could
reduce the isp’s incentive to build bandwidth. The reason for this diﬀerence in
results is as follows. In Choi and Kim, the amount of content sent is independent
of the isp’s capacity. Consequently, expanding capacity serves to increase speed
on both the low-speed and high-speed service. Because the low-speed service
is now faster, switching to low-speed service is more attractive for a high-type
content provider than before. Hence, the amount of surplus the isp can capture
from selling high-speed service to such an content provider is reduced. This eﬀect
reduces the beneﬁt the isp gets from increasing capacity. This is a standard
result for second-degree price discrimination on the basis of quality: improving
25The function plog(·) is sometimes called the product-log function.Extensions 24
the low type’s quality reduces the rent that can be captured from the high
type. Ambiguity arises in Choi and Kim because the high-speed service is also
becoming faster. This increases a high-type content provider’s willingness to
pay for the high-speed service. As Choi and Kim observe, which of these two
eﬀects dominates is a priori ambiguous. In contrast, in our model, the amount
of content traded is not ﬁxed. The content providers’ proﬁts are increasing in
the amount of content traded. Price discrimination permits the isp to capture
some of the increased content-provider proﬁt that greater bandwidth generates.
Hence, the isp’s incentives to expand bandwidth are unambiguously greater
when it can discriminate than when it cannot.
This discussion also indicates why the relative magnitudes of σ and π matter
for the welfare conclusion. When σ is relatively large (exceeds ζπ), the addi-
tional incentive to expand bandwidth that comes from being able to charge the
content providers is relatively small; hence, the additional bandwidth vis-` a-vis
the amount it would build under neutrality is relatively small. So the additional-
bandwidth beneﬁt is correspondingly relatively minor and is outweighed by the
static ineﬃciency of tiering.
6 Extensions
In this section, we brieﬂy consider some extensions of our model.
6.1 Unit Pricing by the ISP
In the United States, as well as many other countries, residential isps charge
neither households nor content providers per unit of content transported (i.e.,
there are no per-byte or per-packet fees). Often, as modeled above, households
pay a ﬂat fee that entitles them to “all they can eat.” In some places there are
limits on the amount that can be downloaded.26 But even plans with limits do
not charge on a per-unit basis. Nevertheless, it is worth brieﬂy considering the
implications for our analysis of per-unit pricing.
To start, suppose the isp charges β per unit, where β does not depend on





ω(p + β) from a θ-type content provider that is, itself, charging p per
unit. The content provider will set its price to maximize
(q + p − c)ω(p + β). (32)
Alternatively, if the isp charges the content provider directly, the content provider
will set its price to maximize
(q + p − β − c)ω(p). (33)
Changing the control variable in (32) to z = p+β, it is readily seen that the two
programs are the same. This is, of course, the usual result that statutory inci-
dence is irrelevant to the determination of actual incidence. Let P∗ denote the
26For instance, as of this writing, Rogers, a major Canadian isp has a service plan that
provides unlimited use up to a monthly limit of 250 gigabytes of data download.Extensions 25
amount households pay, in total, in equilibrium. As just noted, it is independent
of the statutory incidence.
It is straightforward to see that, for a β that is constant across content
providers, the analysis of Section 3 carries through with P∗ replacing p∗ in the
relevant expressions. To conclude:
Proposition 10. Suppose the isp charges either households or content providers
a fee (β) per unit of content transferred. Propositions 1–5 remain true.
What per-unit fee would the isp set? In answering this question, we limit
attention to settings in which the isp cannot charge content providers an access
fee (i.e., s ≡ 0). Suppose, initially, the per-unit fee cannot vary across content
type. The isp’s proﬁt is η + βX, where η is the household hookup fee and X
total content traded; hence, the isp’s proﬁt is









































where p∗(β) is the solution to maximizing (32) with respect to p.27 It follows
immediately from (34) that, given this form of pricing, the isp does best under
the welfare-maximizing allocation of bandwidth (i.e., the allocation that maxi-
mizes the last integral in (34)). Its choice of β will maximize the expression in
large parentheses in the last line of (34). To summarize:
Proposition 11. An isp that can charge a common fee (β) per unit of content,
but which cannot charge content providers an access fee (i.e., s ≡ 0), maximizes
its proﬁt by allocating bandwidth in the welfare-maximizing manner.
If the isp could set the per-unit fee as a function of the content (i.e., charge
β(θ) per unit of type-θ content), then it is readily seen that its optimization
program is essentially the same as (34):
max
β( )


















Given any bandwidth division, pointwise optimization reveals that the isp would
set a common per-unit fee. But with a common per-unit fee, Proposition 11
implies:
27An equivalent analysis can be done starting from (33).Extensions 26
Proposition 12. An isp that can charge a fee (β(θ)) per unit of content that
varies by content type, θ, but which cannot charge content providers an access
fee (i.e., s ≡ 0), maximizes its proﬁt by allocating bandwidth in the welfare-
maximizing manner and by setting a common per-unit fee.
6.2 Heterogeneous Households
A potential limitation to the analysis to this point is that is has assumed house-
holds are homogenous. A more realistic model would recognize that households
are heterogeneous in their preferences.
Two questions arise when the analysis is extended to allow for heterogeneous
households:
1. How to model household heterogeneity?
2. How to account for the consequent welfare loss that would arise from the
residential isp’s monopoly pricing of households’ Internet connections in
an assessment of network neutrality?
The second question has to do with the following. With homogeneous house-
holds, the residential isp’s pricing to households is non-distortionary insofar as
all households are served in equilibrium. If households are heterogeneous, then
the usual monopoly distortion would arise: in order to capture more of the sur-
plus of households that place a high value on connecting to the Internet, the
isp would end up excluding those households with a lesser value of connection.
The usual deadweight loss associated with monopoly pricing attains. Moreover,
there would be a negative access externality imposed on content providers—
content providers lose proﬁts they would have enjoyed had they been able to
trade with the households that elect not to connect.28
The deadweight loss from too few households connecting would be reduced if
the residential isp were allowed to charge content providers. The reason is that,
by connecting more households, the isp can charge content providers more (the
access externality). Hence, a result familiar to two-sided markets attains: the
ability to charge the other side of the market (e.g., content providers) induces
the platform to charge the one side (households) less. Although, as shown
above, allowing the residential isp to charge content providers can be welfare
reducing in itself, we are in a second-best world and the so-called theory of
the second best applies. In particular, introducing the distortion of the isp’s
being able to charge content providers ameliorates the distortion of the isp’s
monopoly pricing to households. A departure from network neutrality could
then be welfare improving in light of this amelioration eﬀect.
This discussion raises, however, a philosophical point. Abandoning network
neutrality is not inherently desirable; it simply may be desirable to oﬀset another
distortion. Hence, should the policy prescription be drop neutrality or should it
28See Taylor (1994, Chapter 9) for an early discussion of access externalities. Inter alia,
Economides and T˚ ag (in press) consider access externalities in an Internet context.Extensions 27
be, instead, to eliminate the root cause, which is the residential isp’s exercise of
its monopoly position vis-` a-vis the households? This, then, is the issue behind
the second question.
Turning to the ﬁrst question, there are many ways to model heterogenous
households in this context. One is that some households have an intrinsically
greater value for Internet connections than others. This could be captured by
multiplying the outer integral in (2) by a type parameter, ξ. An alternative
means of capturing this would be to assume that the adjustment function varies
across households (i.e., replace α(τ,θ) with α(τ,θ,ξ)). Yet another way to
model heterogenous households is to assume diﬀerent households want diﬀerent
content; hence, if Θ(ξ) is the measurable set of content types a type-ξ household
















The reader can readily envision various extensions and combinations of these
formulations. What we will show, now, is that none of these ways of introducing
heterogenous households changes the results in Section 3 in any substantial way.
Suppose, ﬁrst, that household utility is
y +
  ¯ θ
θ












where ξ ∈ Ξ ⊆ R+ denotes a household’s type. Let Υ( ) be the distribution
function over Ξ. As a slight abuse of notation, we will sometimes write Υ(  Ξ) to
denote the proportion of households with a type in set   Ξ. Assume α(τ,θ, ) is
measurable with respect to Υ for all τ ∈ [0,∞) and θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ). Deﬁne
A
 










Assume that   Ξ is the set of households that connect to the Internet. Following
the analysis of Section 2.2, it is readily seen that a given content provider’s
demand is A
 
τ(θ),θ,   Ξ
 
ω(p). It follows that all content provider’s price at the
same p∗ as in Section 2.2. Hence, a given content provider’s gross proﬁt is
A
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π. It is readily seen that a given connected household’s consumer




σ and, hence, aggre-
gate consumer surplus from all trade with content provider θ is A
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σ.
It follows, therefore, that total welfare is
W =




τ(θ),θ,   Ξ
 
dF(θ). (7′)
Straightforward calculations reveal that the identity between time and band-




















did in Section 3. We can conclude:
Proposition 13. Suppose household utility is given by (2 ′′). Fix the set of
household types that connect to the Internet. Propositions 1–3 and 5 remain
true. In addition, if A(τ,θ,   Ξ), as deﬁned by (35), is multiplicatively separable
into γ(τ)V (θ,   Ξ) with ∂V/∂θ > 0 and γ( ) satisfying the conditions set forth
in Proposition 4, then welfare neutrality is welfare superior to any division of
the bandwidth and strictly superior to any division that either excludes some
measurable segment of content or results in diﬀerent groups of content providers’
having their content being sent with diﬀerent transmission times in equilibrium.
Next, suppose that household utility is given by (2) except the outer integral
is multiplied by the type parameter, ξ. Following the analysis of Section 2.2,















Ω(p,   Ξ)
(note the implicit deﬁnition of Ω). It readily follows that all content providers
will charge a common price, ˆ p. Deﬁne ˆ π by
ˆ π = (q + ˆ p − c)Ω(ˆ p,   Ξ).
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ˆ p
Ω(p,   Ξ)dp. (36)
Let ˆ σ equal the value of the last integral in (36). It follows, therefore, that
all the analysis in Section 3 carries over to here, except with π, σ, and ω(p∗)
replaced, respectively, by ˆ π, ˆ σ, and Ω(ˆ p,   Ξ). We can conclude:
Proposition 14. Suppose household utility is given by (2), but with the beneﬁt
from the Internet scaled by household type (i.e., the outer integral multiplied by
ξ). Fix the set of household types that connect to the Internet. Propositions 1–5
remain true.
Last, suppose that household utility is given by (2′); that is, diﬀerent house-
hold types vary with respect to the content they may wish to acquire. Deﬁne
Ξ(θ|  Ξ) =
 
ξ ∈   Ξ
   θ ∈ Θ(ξ)
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that is, Ξ(θ|  Ξ) is the set of connected household types that may wish to acquire
content θ. Assume Ξ(θ|  Ξ) is measurable with respect to Υ for all θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ).
The content demand for a household that wishes to trade at all with a given
















τ(θ),θ,   Ξ
 
ω(p). (37)
(Note the implicit deﬁnition of A.) It is readily veriﬁed that all content providers
price at the same p∗ as in Section 2.2. It follows that a given content provider’s
gross proﬁt is A
 
τ(θ),θ,   Ξ
 
π and also that a given household’s consumer surplus




σ, where π and σ are the
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σ .
It follows, therefore, that total welfare is
W =




τ(θ),θ,   Ξ
 
dF(θ). (7′′)
Straightforward calculations reveal that the identity between time and band-




















did in Section 3. We can conclude:
Proposition 15. Suppose household utility is given by (2 ′); that is, diﬀerent
household types wish to trade with diﬀerent content providers. Fix the set of
household types that connect to the Internet. Propositions 1–3 and 5 remain
true. In addition, if A(τ,θ,   Ξ), as deﬁned by (37), is multiplicatively separable
into γ(τ)V(θ,   Ξ) with ∂V/∂θ > 0 and γ( ) satisfying the conditions set forth
in Proposition 4, then welfare neutrality is welfare superior to any division of
the bandwidth and strictly superior to any division that either excludes some
measurable segment of content or results in diﬀerent groups of content providers’
having their content being sent with diﬀerent transmission times in equilibrium.
As noted, the introduction of heterogenous households complicates a welfare
assessment of discriminatory pricing (and corresponding service tiering) by isps
vis-` a-vis the content providers. The introduction of heterogenous households
also introduces the question of price discrimination by the isp vis-` a-vis the
households themselves (e.g., residential isps could—and do—oﬀer households
faster speed for all the content they acquire or greater download allowances in
exchange for higher monthly access fees). Unfortunately, an analysis of that
question is beyond the scope of the current paper.Extensions 30
6.3 Content Providers with Varying Margins
The analysis to this point has assumed that all content providers’ margins are
the same holding price constant; that is, we assume the advertising rate, q,
less the marginal cost of content production and transmission, c, is the same
across the content providers (i.e., δ ≡ q − c is a constant). Here, we show that
assumption can be partially relaxed, at least with respect to the analysis of
Section 3.
Continue to assume a continuum of content providers of measure one. Let
them now, however, be indexed by (θ,δ), where δ ∈ [δ, ¯ δ) ⊂ R. Assume, crit-
ically, that the two dimensions are distributed independently. As before, F,
is the distribution function over θ. Let ∆( ) be the distribution function over
δ. Making the content providers’ types multidimensional greatly complicates
any analysis of price discrimination by the isp, and we do not attempt such an
analysis in what follows.29 In particular, we assume that any tiering is with
respect to the θ dimension only (i.e., τ can be a function of θ but not δ).
Following the analysis in Section 2.2, a content provider with margin δ will
set its price to maximize
(δ + p)ω(p);
let p∗(δ) denote the solution to that program. The content sold by a (θ,δ)-type



























































   Ω.
(Note the implicit deﬁnition of   Ω.) It is straightforward to verify that the
analysis of Section 3 carries over to this case, with Π, Σ, and   Ω in place of π,
σ, and ω(p∗), respectively. To conclude:
29For a discussion of the issues and complications that arise with screening over multiple
dimensions see Rochet and Chon´ e (1998) or Basov (2010).Extensions 31
Proposition 16. Suppose content providers’ margins vary independently of the
household taste parameter (i.e., δ, the margin, and θ, the taste parameter, are
independently distributed). Propositions 1–4 remain true.
If δ and θ are not independently distributed across content providers, then
the previous analysis is no longer valid. That noted, it is not obvious that a
particular dependence should exist between the tastes of the households and
the production technology of the content providers or the scope for advertis-
ing. Hence, independence strikes us as a reasonable assumption as a ﬁrst-order
approximation to reality.
6.4 Generalization of the Household Utility Function
Our assumptions about household utility, expression (2), are essential to making
the model tractable. Nevertheless, these assumptions are strong and it is worth
therefore considering their importance for our analysis and the extent to which
they can be relaxed.
An alternative speciﬁcation to (2) is
U = y + U
   ¯ θ
θ














where U( ) is increasing and concave. Suppose U( ) is diﬀerentiable. If U( ) is
not too curved, then a reasonable approximation to this last expression is
y + U′(M)
  ¯ θ
θ











dF(θ) + U(M) − MU′(M), (2′′′)
where M is a suitable constant around which to make a ﬁrst-order Taylor ex-
pansion. It is clear that an analysis with U′(M)m( ) instead of m( ) will yield
similar results to those derived above. Hence, (2′′′) is equivalent to (2) and we
can thus view our earlier analysis as an approximation to an analysis of the
more general utility function given by (38).
In terms of economics, this discussion indicates that as long as the marginal
utility from consuming a given content provider’s content varies little when the
consumption of all content changes (i.e., as long as U′( ) is close to constant),
then (2) is a reasonable approximation of household preferences.
A related issue concerns the additive separability in (2). For disparate types
of goods, additive separability is an accepted approximation in the literature.
The approximation is less reasonable, though, for goods that are substitutes
or complements. Even so, substitutes are not necessarily a signiﬁcant issue: a
plausible approximation is to model households as being of a type to consume
from one or another content provider of similar content, but not from both
(e.g., a household watches tv shows from Hulu or iTunes, but not both).30 To
the extent that is a reasonable approximation, then we are eﬀectively assuming
30An objection to assuming diﬀerent household types consume one or the other similarExtensions 32
households have preferences given by (2′). As shown in Proposition 15, such
preferences yield similar results to those derived when preferences are given by
(2). The issue of complementary content is less readily dismissed. Whether
there are signiﬁcant complementarities across the content of diﬀerent content
providers is an open question, but we see no obvious reason to suspect com-
plementarities are so critical in this context that they render (2) or (2′) wholly
invalid approximations to actual household preferences.
Lastly, there is the speciﬁcation of marginal utility, expression (1). This spec-
iﬁcation generates the highly tractable demand function given in (5). Moreover,
when combined with a quasi-linear and additively separable utility function,
expression (2), it justiﬁes using consumer surplus as a measure of consumer
welfare and provides tractable forms for both consumer surplus and overall wel-
fare (expressions (21) and (7), respectively).
There are, of course, other speciﬁcations of demand besides (5) that would
reﬂect the phenomenon that delays in content delivery should reduce demand
for content ceteris paribus. What we now show, via an example, is that similar
conclusions to those reached earlier are still possible under such alternative








Observe, we are returning to the assumption of a single dimension of type. As a
convenient normalization, suppose q−c ≡ 0. Familiar calculations reveal that a





















Given (39), the Lagrangean associated with constrained welfare maximiza-
tion (the analogue to expression (15)) is




































8τ(θ)2 = 0. (40)







content, but not both, is it rules out the potential eﬀect of prices on household choice. On the
other hand, if we assume households have types, then many models of diﬀerentiated-goods
competition would justify such segregation arising in equilibrium. Given we have, in fact,
ruled out content-provider competition, such a justiﬁcation is, admittedly, speculative.Concluding Remarks 33
that is, welfare is enhanced by giving priority to lower θ content. Given that
content provider proﬁt is still proportional to α(τ,θ), it remains true that the
only feasible discrimination schemes are those in which priority is given to higher
θ content. Hence, for this example, we arrive at the same cautionary result
as in Proposition 5: namely, that among the feasible discrimination schemes,
network neutrality is welfare maximizing. Our key conclusion is, therefore, not
dependent on our having assumed (1). Of course, as was true of our original
analysis, under a diﬀerent functional form for α, a feasible discrimination scheme
could exist that is welfare superior to neutrality (such would, in fact, be true,
given (39), if α(τ,θ) = θ/τ).31
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has analyzed the private and social beneﬁts of allowing residential
isps to exclude or provide tiered service to content and application providers
seeking to engage with the isps’ residential subscribers. We have shown that
under a reasonable model of household (end-user) behavior, the evaluation of
various tiering or prioritization schema can be reduced to an assessment of which
schema will permit the greatest ﬂow of content (Proposition 1). The reason we
can focus on the amount of content is that households optimally adjust their
consumption of diﬀerent content as the transmission speeds of that content vary.
There are practical and regulatory reasons to see the set of possible schema
as being limited. In particular, the focus of much of the network neutrality de-
bate has been on schema that are forms of second-degree price discrimination.
Because content providers must be induced to play their part in any such price
discrimination scheme, the set of feasible schema is restricted. Hence, even if
network neutrality—no exclusion and no discrimination—is not welfare maxi-
mizing generally, it could be welfare-maximizing within this restricted set. In
particular, if the elasticity of content demand with respect to transmission time
does not increase with households’ time sensitivity for the content, then net-
work neutrality is welfare maximizing within the set of feasible schema (Propo-
sition 5). If that elasticity is invariant with households’ time sensitivity for the
content, then network neutrality is welfare superior to all other schema (feasible
or not) as shown in Proposition 4.
Endogenizing an isp’s bandwidth-building decision potentially alters some
of these conclusions; that is, dynamic issues could make departing from network
neutrality welfare superior to maintaining it. Using a limited version of our more
general model, we showed that the static eﬃciency of neutrality nevertheless
outweighs dynamic issues if household utility signiﬁcantly dominates as a share
of overall welfare.
As with any model, a number of simplifying assumptions were imposed.
As we showed in Section 6, many of our results continue to hold even relaxing
31The existence of a feasible scheme that dominates neutrality does not imply that the
scheme a proﬁt-maximizing isp would choose to impose would necessarily be welfare superior
to neutrality; as noted in the discussion around Proposition 5, the isp could “over do it.”Appendix A: Proofs and Technical Matters 34
those assumptions. As, however, was also made evident in that section, relaxing
some assumptions generate other issues to be explored. Among these, a critical
one could be an analysis of what happens when the isp is engaging in price
discrimination on both sides of the market; that is, unlike in the analysis in this
paper, exploring what happens if the isp can also engage in discrimination on
the household-side of the market. Although additional study on issues such as
those is warranted—and we recognize this paper is unlikely to be the ﬁnal word
on the topic—we nonetheless believe the various insights oﬀered above will serve
to inform a debate that has been long on advocacy and short on analysis.
Appendix A: Proofs and Technical Matters
Proof of Proposition 4: In light of Proposition 1, the result follows if we can
show that content sent under neutrality is not less (or exceeds) output under
division.










Deﬁne φn = Bn/B; that is, φn is the proportion of the bandwidth allocated to
the nth transmission group. Denote by N the class of groups that are allocated
a positive amount of bandwidth (i.e., φn > 0 for n ∈ N). From (9) and (19),












Because the φn sum to one, expression (42) is an expected value. By Jensen’s































where the last inequality is strict if [θ, ¯ θ)\
 
n∈N Θn is a set of positive measure
(i.e., if a positive measure of content providers are excluded). The last term
in (43) is (41) (i.e., content under neutrality). So no division can increase the
amount of content sent relative to neutrality and a division strictly reduces the
amount sent if it excludes a positive measure of content providers. Finally, if,











then Jensen’s inequality implies (42) is strictly less than the ﬁrst term in (43).
Multiplying the left side of (44) by γ(tn)/γ(tn) and the right side by γ(tm)/γ(tm),
it follows that inequality (44) holds if and only if g(tn) = tn/γ(tn)  = tm/γ(tm) =
g(tm). Because g( ) is strictly monotonic, (44) holds if tn  = tm. This establishes
that a division, which results in content providers having their content being
sent with diﬀerent transmission times, is strictly welfare inferior to neutrality.
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